Pakistan Army Orbat for Operation Grand Slam, Chaamb
September 1, 1965
v.1.0 March 24, 2002
Ravi Rikhye
The strategic reasoning behind Operation Grand Slam has never been clear. The Sino-India War 1962 had led India to begin a massive military expansion. Pakistan, correctly believing this expansion would make impossible the wresting of Indian Kashmir by force, decided to send a combination of regular troops and hastily recruited locals to infiltrate Indian Kashmir, and trigger an uprising. Operation Gibraltar failed, because the locals instead of rising against India, helped Indian forces apprehend the infiltrators.
The popular view is that frustration at the failure of Gibraltar led Pakistan to expand the war with an attack at Chaamb in an attempt to cut the sole Indian road Pathankot-Jammu-Poonch, and then to advance north, rolling up Indian 25th Division from the flank. If this explanation is correct, Pakistan did not act sensibly: standing Indian doctrine was to respond to an attack on Kashmir with an Indian counteroffensive at a place of its own choosing. This is what India did, when it launched I and XI Corps across the international frontier. This forced Pakistan to end the Chaamb offensive: 7th Division was pulled south to reinforce threatened Pakistani positions.
A revisionist explanation is that the Indian attack against the Haji Pir Pass in August, 1965, intended to deny Pakistani infiltrators jumping off areas in the Poonch-Uri sectors, alarmed Pakistan into believing that India planned a general offensive against Pakistan Kashmir. Grand Slam, then, was intended to preempt such an offensive. If Pakistan really believed India intended this, then Grand Slam does make sense, with the caveat that having failed in its gambit over Kashmir, Pakistan might have done better to cut its losses rather than to expand the war. From the Indian side we know, of course, that India had no intention of trying to recover Pakistan Kashmir.
Whatever the reason, once launched, Grand Slam demonstrated the shortcomings of just about every offensive conducted in South Asia since 1947 with the exception of the Indian 1971 East Pakistan campaign. The infantry’s "spirit" is supposed to compensate for a multitude of shortcomings, such as adequate reconnaissance, supporting armor, artillery, and airpower. The infantry of both sides in facts shows such a high degree of spirit that attacking formations are exhausted in the first 48-72 hours, and there never are reserves for exploitation. This is because, for political reasons, both sides try and protect as much frontage as possible with a line of thinly spread out troops, instead of being prepared to give up territory in one area, thus gaining the ability to decisively mass in another.
Pakistan proposed to overrun Indian positions defended by five infantry battalions with seven infantry battalions and two tank regiments. This was a chancy proposition to begin with, because two of Pakistan’s infantry battalions were committed to defending the left flank of Grand Slam against counterattacks by Indian 25th Division. Further, India’s five battalions represented only its first outpost: more brigades were available behind.
In the event, surprise and the Pakistan infantry’s attacking spirit did push the Indians out of Chaamb, but with nothing to follow-up, the attack first bogged down, and then was reversed as Pakistani troops began to be redeployed in response to India’s general offensive of September 6.
Besides the lack of reserves, other problems were evident. GOC 12 Division was responsible for a 400 km sector, surely one of the longest operational sectors in the world, and the Chaamb battle took place right at the southern end of the line. This is why HQ 7th Division was inducted within a day-and-a-half of the offensive’s start. Common sense would have shown this should have been done from the start.
Next, Pakistan entered the 1965 War with an immense shortage of infantry vis-à-vis India. The United States had somehow managed to persuade Pakistan it needed only seven battalions per division. Possibly the reasoning was that Pakistani infantry battalions were more powerfully armed than the Indian. Moreover, the Azad Kashmir infantry was not as well trained or equipped as the regular Pakistan infantry – the Punjab, Baluch, and Frontier Force regiments. The Indians, by contrast, continued with the usual 9 battalions per division, and Kashmir divisions either had additional brigades, or more battalions per brigade, or both, and the Indians had more divisions overall, even with the need to protect against China. With more infantry battalions, Pakistan could have exploited its initial gains.
Pakistan did have an advantage in artillery. The numerical superiority was marginal, but since it was attacking, Pakistan could mass its guns whereas Indian artillery was scattered all over the sector. Moreover, Pakistan had been a good student of its American teachers; the commander of the 4th Corps Artillery Brigade in particular, according to Pakistani accounts, was a superb gunner. Throughout the 1965 War Pakistan artillery time and again broke up Indian infantry attacks. This superiority continued through the 1971 war: in both cases Pakistan was hampered by a shortage of ammunition. As late as the 1999 battles in Kargil Pakistan artillery was demonstrating its capability. In 1965, however, the artillery advantage was not big enough to decisively affect the battle. The same was true for armor: Pakistan had more medium regiments than India and better tanks. Again, however, the number of regiments was insufficient to make a difference.
HQ 12th Infantry Division [Maj.-Gen. Akhtar Malik] Only September 1-2, 1965
4th Azad Kashmir Brigade [Brig. Abdul Hamid Khan]
- 5th Azad Kashmir
- 14th Azad Kashmir
- 19th Azad Kashmir
102nd Infantry Brigade [Brig. Zafar Ali Khan]
- 9th Punjab
- 13th Punjab
- 12th Frontier Force (Reconnaissance & Support) (two companies)
- 11th Cavalry (ex-6th Armored Division)
- 13th Lancers (ex-6th Armored Division)
10th Infantry Brigade (ex 7th Division) [Brig. Azmat Hayat Khan]
- 6th Frontier Force
- 14th Punjab
Artillery
4th Artillery Brigade (ex-I Corps)
- 39th Field Regiment
- 8th Medium Regiment
- 32nd Medium Regiment
- 28th Medium Regiment
- 124 Battery, 33 Heavy Regiment
- 127 Battery, 34 Heavy Regiment
- 111 Battery, 29 LAA Regiment
7th Division Artillery
- 2nd Field Regiment
- 27th Field Regiment
- 107th Division Locating Battery
12th Division Artillery
- Unidentified, possibly 2-3 regiments
HQ 7th Infantry Division [Maj.-Gen. Yahya Khan] assumes command from 12th Division, 1100 Hours, September 2, 1965.
6th Infantry Brigade [Brig. Eftikhar Khan Januja] Relieves 10th Brigade September 4.
- 8th Baluch
- 15th Punjab